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Police compliance with the law is one of the most impor- 
tant aspects of a democratic society. Americans expect 
the police to enforce laws to promote safety and to 
reduce crime, victimization, and fear, but no one 
believes that the police should have unlimited power to 
do so. We expect police to enforce laws fairly according 
to law and rules that circumscribe their enforcement 
powers. The existence of these rules justify the claim 
that police are a rule-bound institution engaged in the 
pursuit of justice and the protection of individual liber- 
ties, as well as the battle against crime. This article 
reviews research on the extent to which police follow 
laws and rules, especially constitutional criminal proce- 
dure rules, addressing seizures, searches, interrogations, 
and deadly force. Also reviewed is research pertaining to 
police adherence to rules governing excessive force, 
corruption, and racial profiling. 
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s the National Research Council's report 
airness and Effectiveness in Policing: The 
Evidence (hereafter referred to as the "commit- 
tee's report") points out, police compliance with 
the law is one of the most important aspects of a 
democratic society. The committee reviewed 
research on police compliance with the U.S. 
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Constitution, state laws, and the policies and standards of their own organizations. 
The existence of these rules justify the claim that police are a rule-bound institu- 
tion engaged in the pursuit of justice and the protection of individual liberties, as 
well as the battle against crime. Although the authority of the state granted to 
police to enforce the laws is circumscribed by the various types of laws we review 
here, it is also the case that the exercise of police power in the United States takes 
place largely at the discretion of individual officers. The decision to make a traffic 
stop or issue a ticket, to make an arrest or issue a stern warning, or to use force to 
accomplish any of these things is in the hands of officers on the street. 
Everything about policing makes this exercise of discretion hard to monitor and 
control. The organization under which officers work struggles to keep control of its 
field force. Most police officers work alone or with a partner-not under the con- 
stant gaze of an assembly-line foreman. Police officers go out into the night heavily 
armed, and we know little about what they do there except what they report on 
pieces of paper that they sometimes fill out to document their activities. Many of 
the encounters police officers have occur under potentially troublesome circum- 
stances. The individuals whom officers meet during these encounters include 
alleged offenders, drunks, the homeless, and prostitutes-those with "spoiled" 
identities. The complaints these individuals may have about their treatment by 
officers may not be taken very seriously. Because police work outside the public 
eye, they routinely have opportunities to engage in a laundry list of corrupt activi- 
ties. Moreover, it is difficult to punish such misbehavior due to the civil service 
protections afforded police as public employees. In many regions of the country, 
policing is unionized, and provisions of the labor agreement can further bind the 
hands of top management when it comes to supervising, rewarding, disciplining, 
and firing employees. 
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In addition to this long list of factors, many of the recent innovations reviewed in 
the committee's report recognize, celebrate, and extend this operational inde- 
pendence. The foundational premise underlying both problem-solving policing 
and community policing is that community and crime-related problems vary tre- 
mendously from place to place and that their causes and solutions are highly con- 
textual. In such contexts, we expect police to use good judgment rather than 
enforce the letter of the law in order to produce good results. Decentralizing, 
reducing hierarchy, granting officers more independence, and trusting in their 
professionalism are the organizational reforms of choice today, not tightening up 
the management screws to further constrain officer discretion. This is especially 
true when "we," the segment of the public that has not traditionally had antagonis- 
tic relationship with the police, are the ones demanding better outcomes from 
policing. 
Most police officers are honest and stay out of 
serious trouble for their entire careers. Most 
citizens who come into contact with the police 
are satisfied with the experience, even when 
they were on the receiving end 
of an investigation. 
Somehow, this witches' brew of authority and autonomy usually works out. Most 
police officers are honest and stay out of serious trouble for their entire careers. 
Most citizens who come into contact with the police are satisfied with the experi- 
ence, even when they were on the receiving end of an investigation. There is evi- 
dence that it has been working out better and better over time. In a paper review- 
ing trends in American policing over the course of the twentieth century, historian 
Samuel Walker (2001a) concludes that police at century's end are better trained, 
more professional, less likely to use excessive or fatal force, and more effective than 
they were in previous decades. 
But, inevitably, it sometimes does not work out. Police are what the British call 
"the sharp end of the stick" when it comes to regulating the social and economic 
relationships in society. Their capacity to use force authoritatively and take lives 
lawfully in the course of regulating our lives uniquely defines the police. We are 
then led to the task of constructing legal and organizational mechanisms for hem- 
ming in the exercise of police discretion and ensuring that it is exercised in accor- 
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dance with law and public policy. Just how to construct and enforce such rules can 
be a difficult puzzle. It is not easy to impose these rules, and it is not easy to make 
them work. This article presents an overview of what is known about the nature and 
extent of police lawfulness and about the effectiveness of mechanisms to control it. 
The evidence that it summarizes is documented in detail in the committee's report. 
Here, we present our main conclusions about this research and our judgments 
about its implications for policies aimed at ensuring police lawfulness. 
How Police Get in Trouble 
Since 1934, the Supreme Court has regularly reviewed the practices of local 
police. Like many early cases, Brown v. Mississippi (297 U.S. 278, 1935) evoked 
the Court's twin concern with racial discrimination-Brown was a black man-and 
egregious police conduct, in this instance the extraction of a confession through 
torture. Later cases erected a dense network of rules delimiting police power to 
stop people on the street, conduct searches, question them in custody, and listen in 
on their conversations. Taken together, these cases establish what we now recog- 
nize as modern constitutional criminal procedure: rules that provide the link 
between constitutional principles and the daily actions of the police. On their face, 
these rules greatly constrain the authority of the police. Social scientists know, of 
course, that pronouncing a rule does not automatically make it so. They are not 
self-enforcing, and individual officers have to learn and actually follow them. 
Where they do not, police can get in trouble, and this section reviews what we know 
about the lawfulness of police activities in the line of duty in several key areas. Nei- 
ther are the more mundane laws that govern police corruption automatically 
effective, and corruption is another way that police get in trouble. 
Interrogations 
Brown involved the lawfulness of an interrogation. It was followed by a line of 
cases reviewing under the due process clause of the Constitution the appropriate 
and voluntary nature of police questioning of suspects and taking of confessions. 
Miranda v. Arizona (372 US. 436, 1966), one of the best-known and most thor- 
oughly researched Supreme Court decisions, represents a break in this sort of deci- 
sion making. Rather than reviewing the voluntarism of Miranda's confession under 
due process principles, the Court imposed on police via the Fifth Amendment 
responsibility for delivering the famous four-part warning, which is familiar to any 
regular viewer of television drama, to any suspect during a custodial interrogation. 
In fact, Miranda's four-part warning may be the best-known element of criminal 
procedure. Initially, the Miranda decision was criticized for "hamstringing" police 
in the pursuit of criminals, but in Dickerson v. United States (120 S. Ct. 2326, 
2000), even a Supreme Court that might have threatened the ruling decided 
instead that it "has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where 
the warnings have become part of our national culture (p. 2336)." 
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Miranda presented a natural case for social research. It involves a clearly 
observable requirement (the four warnings) that might be followed or ignored, and 
its critics posed a hypothesis to be tested (it would hamstring the police). The stud- 
ies that followed paint an ironic picture of Miranda in action: it seems that the 
police follow the rule, and it does not have much effect. 
The first big study of Miranda did not actually come to that complete conclu- 
sion. Donald Black and Albert Reiss Jr. had a large field study of police operations 
under way when the decision was announced. They added the warning to the 
checklist of things their observers were looking for as they rode along with officers. 
They found that the required warnings were frequently not given when police 
arrested suspects, but they also found that for felonies, there was typically alternate 
physical evidence and eyewitness testimony that police could rely on (Black and 
Reiss 1967). Subsequent studies have almost universally found high levels of verbal 
compliance with this constitutional requirement, so it is likely that the low compli- 
ance rate they observed was an artifact of the timing of the Black and Reiss project. 
For example, Leo (1996) observed detectives at work and found essentially 100 
percent compliance with the letter of the law. 
Other studies have confirmed the other Black and Reiss conclusion: in routine 
cases, confessions are rarely the only evidence available for submission to the pros- 
ecutor. This is one of the factors that has mitigated the impact of Miranda, belying 
the early charge that it would severely undercut the crime-fighting effectiveness of 
the police. The reason that the existence of nonconfessional evidence can undercut 
the sting of Miranda's exclusionary rule in situations in which police do follow 
Miranda's prescriptions is that Miranda's exclusionary rule requires that only a 
tainted confession be excluded from trial, not other evidence. Another mitigating 
influence on Miranda's bite is the strategic manner in which police deliver the mes- 
sage. Leo noted how police presented the four warnings in ways that encouraged 
suspects to waive their rights. Terms like perfunctory and superficial are used by 
researchers to describe police delivery. Cassell and Hayman (1996) also observed a 
number of "noncustodial" interviews that took place (technically, legally) without 
warnings, presumably in an attempt to skirt the requirement. In a summary, 
Meares and Harcourt (2000) concluded that in practice, Miranda may reduce the 
number of confessions between 4 and 16 percent, but the availability of other evi- 
dence means that its real impact is considerably lower than that range. 
Searches and seizures 
Seizing people and searching them and their properties are basic law enforce- 
ment tools. Searches and seizures are vital to removing weapons and contraband 
from the street, building criminal cases, and potentially preventing crime. But 
searches and seizures can also be extremely problematic for police. While Ameri- 
cans recognize that searches and seizures are necessary tools for police to do their 
jobs of maintaining order and responding to criminal events, Americans have 
always feared the misuse of these intrusions by the state into their lives. The Fourth 
Amendment speaks directly to "the right of the people to be secure in their per- 
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sons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches." Through its 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has established con- 
cepts such as "probable cause" and "reasonable suspicion" in criminal procedure 
cases as the standard for justifying different types of searches and seizures. 
The principal tool for enforcing judicially imposed injunctions against unrea- 
sonable police conduct is the exclusionary rule, which applies both to state and fed- 
eral prosecutions. A deterrence model underlies the logic of the decision: the rule 
that a demonstrably bad guy can earn a "get out of jail free card" if the evidence 
required to convict him (perhaps a seized gun or trunk load of drugs) was obtained 
improperly is supposed to keep police and prosecutors in line. 
Research in this area attempts to document the extent of police propriety and 
the factors associated with rule bending versus rule minding. Much of it has been 
reactive to changes in legal standards. A large body of research was stimulated by 
the Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio (367 U.S. 643, 1961) to extend the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states. More appeared in the wake of 
follow-up search-and-seizure cases. These include Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1, 
1968), which justifies pat-down searches under the rubric of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness by sanctioning them so long as police could demonstrate reason- 
able suspicion; United States v. Calandra (414 U.S. 338, 1974), which balances the 
exclusion of evidence against its deterrent effect; and United States v. Leon (486 
U.S. 897, 1984), which permits the use of evidence obtained faultily but in good 
faith. Because they have been reactive, there are few before-and-after studies 
assessing the impact of these new rules for police conduct, even though many of 
them read as if that were their goal. 
Search-and-seizure actions by individual officers have been examined in a vari- 
ety of ways. Researchers have ridden with detectives or interviewed them in the 
stationhouse, passed out questionnaires to uniformed officers, and observed 
encounters between the police and the public in the field. Collectively, these stud- 
ies indicate that police mostly follow the rules, but sometimes, they do not. Officers 
know the rules, but they sometimes skirt constitutional standards because they 
want to deter crime by incarcerating the truly guilty. Or if deterrence is not their 
immediate goal, officers sometimes bend rules because they simply want an indi- 
vidual that they have identified as a lawbreaker to get his or her "due" in a sort of 
retributive justice sense. Officers can be quite strategic in pursuing these goals, 
including risking a bit of censure when they have other forms of evidence to fall 
back on if their actions are challenged. Several studies found that officers intent on 
seizing contraband, disrupting illicit networks, or asserting their authority on the 
street freely violated the rules because their goal was not principally to secure an 
individual conviction. 
One of the most recent of these studies involved observations of what happens 
when police confront citizens in the field. The study (Gould and Mastrofski forth- 
coming) documents that field searches are fairly uncommon. Trained observers in 
two cities spent in total more than 2,800 hours in the field observing 12,000 police- 
citizen encounters. During this period, they observed just 115 searches. About 30 
percent were judged to be unconstitutional, but only 10 percent of those (and just 3 
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percent of all searches) involved what they classified as egregious police miscon- 
duct. About 7 percent of suspects who were arrested or cited were searched 
improperly. Most improper searches occurred when officers were looking for 
drugs, a finding that is consistent with earlier work on detective practices. Most of 
the observed violations involved frisking suspect's outer clothing and were not par- 
ticularly invasive. The authors describe the officers involved as "respectful, even 
solicitous," and not distinguishable by their attitudes or other behaviors. Most of 
the rule violations arose during encounters that did not ultimately lead to an arrest 
or citation, so no record of them was left behind. 
Another large study examined the lawfulness of street encounters in New York 
City. The New York Office of the Attorney General (1999) analyzed forms that are 
supposed to be completed by officers when they conduct a stop and frisk. On their 
face, the stops described there were judged to violate Terry standards 14 percent of 
the time (Fagan and Davies 2000). Two measures were also used to test whether 
there was racial bias in the stops themselves. One compared stops by race with the 
race of the neighborhood in which they occurred, while the other made a similar 
adjustment for the racial makeup of arrests in the area as a proxy for who the trou- 
blemakers there were. Both analyses suggested that African Americans were 
disproportionately stopped. 
Researchers have used case files to assess the magnitude of search-and-seizure 
issues and their aggregate consequences at the system level. To assess the cost of 
excluding evidence of guilt, studies have counted lost convictions and concluded 
that they are not particularly frequent. Sutton's (1986) study tracked a large sample 
of cases in seven cities. He found that search warrants were rarely used, judges 
gave only perfunctory review of warrant applications, and the participants sub- 
verted the process by fabricating evidence when necessary. Other researchers have 
done pre-post studies of the impact of Leon and found no impact on police 
practices (Uchida and Bynum 1991). 
Excessive and lethal force 
The use of force is so integral to the police role that a common definition of the 
term police is the body that is lawfully authorized to exercise deadly force against 
citizens. As a price for holding a virtual monopoly over this power, there are stan- 
dards for the use of force, standards that are too often violated. In the United 
States, use of deadly force has been a major source of conflict between minority 
groups and the police. Numerous studies have demonstrated large discrepancies 
between the rate at which African Americans are shot and killed by the police and 
the comparable rate for whites. One found that between 1950 and 1960, African 
Americans were killed by Chicago police at a rate of 16.1 per 100,000, compared 
with a rate of 2.1 per 100,000 for whites (Robin 1963). 
The constitutional rule adopted by the Court to circumscribe the use of deadly 
force by police officers is found in Tennessee v. Garner (471 U.S. 1, 1985). In this 
case, the Supreme Court overturned a permissive fleeing-felon rule that allowed 
police officers to use "all the means necessary to effect an arrest" of even an 
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unarmed fleeing felon. The case arose from the killing of a fifteen-year-old African 
American male in suburban Memphis, and it was imbued with racial tensions. 
Interestingly, few of the states whose statutes on this matter did not comply with 
the Court's ruling were willing to change them; the states relied instead on depart- 
ments to change their policies and procedures. Generally, police are now autho- 
rized to use force in self-defense or when a life is in danger, when certain forcible 
felons flee, or when other means have been exhausted. Both deadly force and 
excessive force claims are also grounds for civil suits under state tort law and 
federal civil rights laws. 
Officers know the rules, but they sometimes 
skirt constitutional standards because 
they want to deter crime by incarcerating 
the truly guilty. 
This is a difficult research area. There is no national repository of data on police 
use of force, and access to local records is difficult. Virtually every study has been 
based on the records of one or a small number of local police departments. Official 
case files inevitably present a situation in which every incentive exists for the orga- 
nization to present a favorable version of events. Studies conducted in agencies 
that voluntarily open their records to researchers probably represent those that are 
most confident of their professionalism. Studies of agencies that are forced to open 
their records because of suits alleging use of excessive force, or through freedom of 
information suits by media organizations, tend to find more racial disparity in the 
use of force, great deals of disparity in the use of deadly force, and higher rates of 
shootings of racial minorities that appear to be questionable (Fyfe 2002). For 
example, Meyer (1980) found that African Americans in Los Angeles were more 
often unarmed when they were shot, and Fyfe (1982) found that African Ameri- 
cans in Memphis were more often shot in circumstances that were not as threaten- 
ing to the officer. 
One firm conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that rates of police 
use of force and deadly force are highly variable. In a recent study, Fyfe (2002) ana- 
lyzed the results of a project conducted by the Washington Post. Using freedom of 
information requests and suits, they assembled data on fatal police shootings in 
fifty-one large municipal and county police and sheriffs departments during 1990 
to 2000. Fatal shootings rates for county police departments varied by a factor of 
14, while for city departments, the ratio of shootings from top to bottom was 8:1 
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and among sheriffs departments it was almost 6:1. In a seven-city study by Milton 
et al. (1977), the top to bottom ratio was also 6:1. Another general conclusion is that 
most police use of force is nonfatal. In one six-agency study, only 17 percent of 
"potentially volatile encounters" (a high-risk sample of incidents) led to the use of 
force, and most of the force was confined to threats, use of restraints, weaponless 
tactics, and control holds (Garner and Maxwell 1999). A final conclusion is that 
there is usually considerable racial disparity in the use of force and often in the use 
of fatal force. Many see such disparities in the exercise of force lying at the core of 
challenges to the legitimacy of American policing in the twenty-first century. 
There is also evidence of the positive effects of legal and administrative fforts 
to control police use of force. Many before-and-after studies of changes in depart- 
ment rules or leadership find evidence that management makes a difference. In a 
study of the use of force by the New York Police Department, Fyfe (1979) found 
that a policy change by the agency led to a precipitous drop in shootings by officers 
there. He also found that New York City police rarely shot unarmed people. Spar- 
ger and Giacopassi (1992) conducted a follow-up study in Memphis, the jurisdic- 
tion in which the Garner decision originated, and found a dramatic reduction in 
racial disparities in police shootings in the post-Garner period. Tennenbaum 
(1994) concluded that Garner reduced fatal police shootings by about sixty per 
year. 
Corruption 
The previous sections reviewed research in which the disjuncture between 
police activity and legal standards ostensibly and typically were grounded in the 
officers' desire to pursue public ends. However, police also deviate from the law for 
personal gain. Corruption is to a certain extent endemic in police departments 
because of the attractive opportunities officers can face when deciding when and 
how to enforce the law. The range of what constitutes corruption is a wide one and, 
at the lower end, depends on department policies. "Police discounts" for meals and 
haircuts fall at one end of the continuum, which widens to include the sale of inside 
information, accepting bribes not to enforce the law or to testify falsely, and even 
payoffs to secure advancement within the department. Corruption may be 
proactive, as when officers seek out and rob street drug dealers, or reactive to 
offers large and small from community members. Some researchers include so- 
called noble-cause corruption in their inventories. This includes investigating, 
arresting, and "testi-lying" people who are "deserving" of punishment, whatever 
the "legal niceties." It is not clear, however, whether including these practices 
increases our ability to understand the scope and frequency of corruption for gain 
or if it just muddies the concept. Other important distinctions are whether corrup- 
tion is organized or freelance work, if it is widespread or found only in isolated 
pockets, if it permeates management ranks or is confined to street officers, and if it 
is linked to more widespread political corruption or is largely confined to police 
ranks. 
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Corruption is not only hard to control but also hard to study systematically. 
Much of what we know in any detailed fashion flows from investigations and testi- 
mony collected by commissions set up in response to public uproar over revela- 
tions of corruption. New York City provides a treasure trove of these reports, 
including those of the Knapp Commission (City of New York 1973) and the Mollen 
Commission (City of New York 1994). Sherman (1978) used media reports and 
investigatory material like these commission reports to develop comparative case 
studies of corruption and reform efforts in four cities. He concluded that corrup- 
tion was highly organized before it surfaced in public view. Another approach is to 
survey officers. While self-report surveys are unlikely to uncover revelations of any 
but the smallest scale side benefits of serving the public, Klockars et al. (2000) and 
others have demonstrated that it is quite fruitful to ask police about the practices of 
others in their agency, the "climate of opinion" among their peers concerning cor- 
ruption, their awareness of the rules concerning misconduct, their support for 
imposing discipline, and their (hypothetical) willingness to report various kinds of 
misconduct internally. For example, Klockars et al. (2000) surveyed officers in 
thirty American police departments and found that, overall, a majority would not 
report a colleague who engaged in the least serious misbehavior (e.g., accepting 
free meals and discounts) but that they would report someone who engaged in 
behaviors judged to be at intermediate or high levels of seriousness (e.g., accepting 
kickbacks from an auto repair shop for referrals, turning in a lost wallet while keep- 
ing the cash from that wallet). Their study also found that police departments 
varied considerably in the climate of integrity. 
Surveys have also asked the general public whether they had been required to 
bribe public officials, including the police, and these open an alternative window 
into the extent of that problem. Some of these, conducted in a number of coun- 
tries, lend a comparative aspect to experiences with police corruption. Unfortu- 
nately, no studies have compared police with any other occupation's corruption 
rate, for this would provide a useful avenue for testing hypotheses involving some 
of the reputedly unique features of police work. 
What seems to lead to corruption? As noted above, many of the most important 
explanations are systemic in character. History provides evidence of the impor- 
tance of very broad social and regulatory factors, for probably no event had a 
greater corrupting effect on police and the American political system generally 
than did the passage of a constitutional amendment prohibiting the manufacture 
and sale of alcoholic beverages in the 1920s. Today's equivalent is drugs. Police 
work combines high discretion with low-visibility decision making in an environ- 
ment that can be awash with tempting opportunities and an ample supply of"regu- 
lar" citizens willing to offer up even more. The drug dealers, prostitutes, and others 
that officers routinely deal with can be robbed or abused with relative impunity. 
Narcotics units are especially prone to problems because of the very large sums of 
money and drugs that come their way, the willingness of both buyers and sellers in 
the marketplace to pay bribes to avoid regulation, and the very low visibility of the 
many discretionary decisions that are made on a daily basis by investigators and 
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their supervisors (U.S. General Accounting Office 1998; Manning and Redlinger 
1977). Officers whose opportunities for career advancement have come to an end 
may be more prone to being on the take. Corruption is very much facilitated by tol- 
erance--or at least passive unresponsiveness--by peer officers in the organization. 
Integrity, on the other hand, can be measured by officers' support for the rules, 
their belief that internal complaints will be investigated fully and fairly, and their 
willingness to report misconduct (Klockars et al. 2000). The public's standards con- 
cerning what constitutes intolerable corruption may set an upper boundary on 
how out of hand corruption may get, and the views of the politicians who represent 
them are probably even more directly important. The aggressiveness of local and 
federal prosecutors, and the intrusiveness of the media, also determine how much 
can go on before heads start to roll. 
Racial profiling 
No controversy in law enforcement today has received more attention than 
racial profiling. There is no ready agreement on what the term means, however. 
While the law enforcement community has defined racial profiling as the practice 
of stopping citizens solely or exclusively because of their race, many others use the 
term to refer to police using race in any way in deciding whom to stop or search, 
except in the instance when race is part of a specific description of a wanted 
offender. Police have defended the legitimacy of considering race along with other 
factors with respect to their decision to stop, search, or otherwise engage citizens, 
arguing that consideration of race in decision making is justified by statistics dem- 
onstrating that racial minorities make up a disproportionate number of suspects 
arrested, convicted, and sentenced nationwide. This stance was quickly challenged 
by the observation that this proved only that the criminal justice system targeted 
black male offenders. While this debate continues, there can be little doubt that 
the term racial profiling and the offense known as driving while black have 
become a part of the nation's lexicon. And it seems that the threat of global 
terrorism will keep the debate alive. 
The problem of racial profiling is inextricably intertwined with the fact that 
police officers have a great deal of discretion in performing their job. Key Supreme 
Court decisions have further increased the range of police discretion in ways that 
are relevant to the racial profiling controversy. Ohio v. Robinette (519 U.S. 33, 
1996) made it easier for police to talk suspects into consenting to a search of their 
person or vehicle. Whren v. United States (517 U.S. 806, 1996) holds that police 
can make traffic stops to investigate suspicions that have nothing to do with the 
traffic offense for which the stop was made-so long as there is an offense. These 
are known as "pretextual traffic stops." 
Given that police must make determinations as to how to perform their job, it is 
not surprising that their judgments could be influenced by racial, ethnic, or gender 
stereotypes. At some point, this becomes a lawfulness issue, although debate over 
where the boundary begins and the appropriate penalties continues. For example, 
a bill introduced (but not passed) during the 107th Congress (Racial Profiling Pro- 
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hibition Act of 2001, HR 1907, 107th Cong., 2nd sess.) defined racial profiling as 
the consideration of race "to any degree or in any fashion" by an officer when 
deciding whom to stop or search, except when race is part of a specific description 
of an offender who committed a crime. The penalties that have been considered 
include losing federal highway funds and other federal grants. On various hit lists 
are the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance 
Programs; the "Cops on the Beat" program under part Q of title I of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets; and the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant 
program of the Department of Justice. 
The road to police reform is largely an 
internal one, featuring training, supervision, 
internal inspections, performance 
measures, and policy making. 
The legal handle for judicial intervention to restrict racial profiling is the consti- 
tutional injunction against depriving persons of their rights, privileges, or immuni- 
ties because of their race, a "legally protected" social category. In the federal sys- 
tem, the Justice Department is authorized to investigate allegations of a pattern or 
practice of discrimination, and it can file civil litigation against police agencies 
found not to be in compliance with the Constitution. 
However, there is just as much controversy over the extent of racial profiling as 
there is over its definition or any other part of this issue. The lack of definitional 
clarity, combined with serious flaws in methods for assessing profiling, make it dif- 
ficult to identify with any confidence how much of it there is, who is doing it, or 
whether it is increasing or decreasing in the face of new policies. A large number of 
agencies are now engaged in new data collection documenting their activities; 
some of this is voluntary, while many are doing so in the face of municipal or state 
requirements. But detecting a "pattern of profiling" (whatever that is defined to 
be) presents difficult data and analytic issues. Studies of the accuracy with which 
officers complete the forms they are supposed to use to record stops, and the accu- 
racy with which they guess citizens' races, do not point in a hopeful direction. Fur- 
thermore, the racial distribution of stops, citations, and even searches does not in 
itself demonstrate much. Profiling can be identified only by comparing the fre- 
quency of encounters to some baseline, a denominator that yields an interpretable 
stop rate. Some have compared traffic stops by race to the population composition 
of the neighborhoods in which they were made. This has little to do with the popu- 
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lation at risk of being stopped, or even better, the offending population at risk of 
being apprehended. There have been attempts to standardize stop counts by the 
racial distribution of drivers, in the expectation that everyone speeds. Traffic 
offending is not randomly distributed, however, and not all police-initiated 
encounters involve only traffic offenses. Studies have used the racial distribution of 
arrests in the area, and even counts of the racial distribution of drivers timed to be 
actually exceeding the speed limit, to estimate the relative size of offending popula- 
tions. However, it is clear that the cheap and simple denominators do not ade- 
quately represent the population at risk of being stopped and that the effort and 
expense required to generate more focused and localized measures is far beyond 
the scope of policing agencies. It is not even clear that the population at risk is the 
most appropriate baseline measure. To develop policies to address the problem, it 
is not enough simply to gather information about those stopped; therefore, another 
way to measure profiling activity might be to focus on the group doing the stop- 
ping-police. Common sense suggests that the problem of racial profiling, how- 
ever defined, is different if a small isolated number of officers are stopping individ- 
uals as opposed to a large dispersed group (Walker 2001c). Other strategies that 
have been proposed for eliminating racial profiling, including in-car video cam- 
eras, have not been evaluated. 
How Police Can Get Out of Trouble 
In the view of the committee, the road to police reform is largely an internal one, 
featuring training, supervision, internal inspections, performance measures, and 
policy making. At this level, controlling police behavior is a management problem. 
For example, a department's use of force policy includes the types of weapons that 
are made available to officers, the rules for their use, training in weapon safety, 
reporting requirements when they are employed, procedures for reviewing the 
appropriateness of their use in an "after-action" report, and the kinds of sanctions 
that can be imposed for their misuse. 
To date, however, little research has examined the effectiveness of managerial 
strategies to secure officer compliance with department policies. As noted earlier, 
some the best evidence comes from studies of the use of lethal force, which has 
shown that administrative changes and determined leadership can reduce shoot- 
ings by police. Changes in policies governing high-speed pursuits can reduce their 
number and save lives. Randomized experiments in responding to domestic vio- 
lence have demonstrated along the way that careful training and supervision can 
change how officers handle those cases, whatever the eventual findings regarding 
their effectiveness. Research on corruption points to the importance of leadership, 
internal accountability, training, internal inspections, and a willingness to 
challenge informal practices and peer tolerance. 
Otherwise, there is not much research on internal police control processes. In 
particular, virtually no research has studied police internal inspection bureaus, 
which are increasingly called professional standards units. They are recognized by 
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police leaders to play a critical role in keeping their organizations in line, but little is 
known about the organization, management, and staffing of these units. Nor is 
much known about the investigative procedures used or patterns of discipline. 
Interestingly, unlike the private sector, virtually no research has focused on systems 
for rewarding good officer performance, through pay or perquisites. Traditionally, 
police management consists of overseeing subordinates until they break a rule in 
the book and then punishing them. It is essentially negative, with little in their 
management kitbag but sanctions for noncompliance; hence, the emphasis on 
internal inspections to ensure compliance with rules. 
If internal processes could be effective at controlling police misconduct, why 
are so many departments demonstrably lacking effective internal controls? One 
problem is that there are contrary political and organizational pressures. Calls to 
get tough on crime can drown out concern about excessive police zeal. In fact, one 
controversial feature of the committee report itself is that it tried to attend to 
research on police lawfulness as well as their crime-fighting effectiveness. Public- 
sector workers, including police and firefighters, are usually well organized on the 
political front, with independent links to powerful local politicians, state legisla- 
tors, and the governor's office. Attempts to reform their organizations thus can lead 
to a tough political fight. In many cities, police departments operate with a signifi- 
cant degree of autonomy, protected by law and order rhetoric, labor agreements, 
and the political clout of their employees. Calls for administrative reform can seem 
to fall on deaf ears, when they do not have to listen. Instead, we tend to get 
individualized, short-term responses to widespread, systemic problems. 
In reaction to the perceived inability of departments to manage themselves, 
external pressure can be mounted in an attempt to reign in police. We have empha- 
sized internal management efforts because ultimately processes have to be put into 
motion inside the organization to make those changes. In the end, these processes 
make up the "transmission belt" by which external pressures translate into internal 
change, and in our judgment, they should be the central focus of reform efforts. 
Without engaging these, most externally imposed solutions to lawfulness problems 
will not be very effective. 
For example, prosecutors can bring criminal charges against individual police 
officers accused of using excessive force or engaging in acts of corruption. In addi- 
tion to exacting justice in that case, we can hope that the message that initiating a 
prosecution sends sets in motion deterrent processes leading to general changes in 
behavior within the organization. However, the committee concluded that this is 
an extremely limited vehicle for changing police organizations. Few cases are 
brought forward by internal inspectors, prosecutors are wary of indicting the police 
officers on whom they depend, intent is difficult to document in excessive force 
cases, it is difficult to convince judges and juries to convict, and the best evidence is 
that the few sentences that are actually imposed in these cases are light. 
The odds of effecting organizational change through civil suits are only a little 
better. In most states, individual victims can sue police for damages, and federal 
rules are in place that allow similar cases to be brought. To a certain extent, civil 
rights and civil liberties groups have begun to use the civil process, again to both 
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right individual wrongs and force organizational reform. Although they can be dif- 
ficult to win, these cases can elicit fairly substantial individual payments. Their 
deterrent impact is muted, however, because legal fees and judgments are paid 
by the city's taxpayers not by individual officers or even (typically) out of the 
department's own budget. The limited research on this point also suggests that 
departments often do not take meaningful disciplinary action against the officers 
Calls to get tough on crime 
can drown out concern about 
excessive police zeal. 
involved, even when they are found at fault in civil court. There is also little evi- 
dence of structural changes in big-city police organizations as a result of damage 
payments, despite the public lamentations of mayors and city council members 
over their cost. It is a cost of doing business, and in actuality, the cost amounts to 
only a small fraction of municipal budgets. Patton (1993, 767) concluded that in 
Los Angeles, the cost of civil suits is considered "a reasonable price for the pre- 
sumed deterrent effect of the department's most violent responses to 
lawbreaking." 
A very limited number of agencies have been swept up in federal "pattern-and- 
practice" suits initiated by the civil rights division of the Department of Justice. 
Congress empowers the department to conduct investigations and to bring suits 
against departments that routinely deprive persons of rights, privileges, or immu- 
nities secured or protected by the Constitution. Three features of these cases 
promise that they may have more impact than the usual criminal and civil suits. 
First, the pattern-and-practice language of the act enables litigation against the 
general practices of a police department, as opposed to identifying and holding a 
single officer culpable for unlawful actions. Second, the settlement agreements 
that arise from these cases include implementing agreed-upon best practices in 
new training, internal investigations, use of potentially lethal equipment, and inci- 
dent reporting. These are the mechanisms for making change in police organiza- 
tions. Third, there is continued supervision of the settlement agreements. In every 
case, a court-appointed monitor watches over its implementation, and in some cit- 
ies (including Pittsburgh and Cincinnati), universities or nonprofit research groups 
monitor the effectiveness of the decrees in resolving the problems that led to them 
in the first place. Often, consent decrees require the collection of systematic data 
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on departmental practices, increasing their transparency. Most have focused on 
police use of force, but the federal settlement with the New Jersey State Police 
required the collection of data on traffic stops, and these have been used to moni- 
tor for racial disparities. In other words, although they are not numerous, pattern- 
and-practice settlements are designed to activate the internal organizational 
mechanisms that we identified at the outset as crucial for sustaining true 
organizational change. 
Citizen-complaint review agencies provide another form of external control of 
the police. There has been a steady growth in the number of citizen-complaint 
review agencies in the United States over the past twenty years. By 2001, there 
were slightly more than a hundred such agencies (Walker 2001b). Virtually all of 
them are created by local ordinances. They take a variety of forms, and this count 
used a broad definition that included any procedure where there is some input, 
however limited, by persons who are not sworn officers in the review of citizen 
complaints against police officers. Some of these agencies have original jurisdic- 
tion for receiving and investigating citizen complaints. Others play an auditing or 
monitoring function, generally overseeing the internal investigatory actions of 
departments. They take so many forms and responsibilities that it is difficult to say 
much in general about them, and the committee's review indicated that so little sys- 
tematic research on these agencies has taken place that their impact is unknown. 
Their appearance reflects a widely enough held belief that police internal affairs 
units, in varying degrees, discourage complaints, fail to investigate complaints 
thoroughly and fairly, and fail to discipline officers who are found to have commit- 
ted misconduct. Police and their supporters in turn deny that excessive force is a 
problem and argue that police departments are better equipped to investigate 
complaints internally, for no one outside the organization can really understand 
police work. 
Conclusion 
The National Research Council's report on policing, Fairness and Effectiveness 
in Policing: The Evidence, emphasizes fairness for a reason. People expect the 
police to enforce laws to promote safety; to reduce crime, victimization, and fear; 
and to redress wrongs, but no one believes that the police should have unlimited 
power to prevent, reduce, or deter crime. In a democratic society, fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice require the circumscription of the authority of the 
state to enforce laws. It is police adherence to the rules that limit their power that 
informs at least one notion of the legitimacy of police operation. The research 
reviewed here goes some way to demonstrating-at least according to available 
research-that police tend to obey the law. The more important, and perhaps 
deeper, question is whether adherence to these rules is enough to establish the 
legitimacy of a key government institution. 
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